Neo-Gramscian Approach to Globalisation: An Evaluation of the Relevance of Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in International Relations

Introduction     

The emergence of globalisation as a prominent feature of current world politics led to some scholars to perceive this phenomenon as the end of history and the triumph of liberal democracy. However, this approach is flawed with respect to a number of aspects. First, in contrast to its claim to have explained change; this approach has a static and ahistorical conception of state. Second, it is unable to call prevailing world order and its origins under question. Last but not least, it fails to take into account the potential for alternative forms of development.

Neo-Gramscian approach, which emerged with the works of Robert Cox in the 1980s, provides a critical understanding of the prevailing order and change, and offers a dialectical understanding of history. This approach is perceived as crucial in understanding globalisation for the reason that social relations of production, interrelated with state forms and global orders, underlie the global neoliberal hegemony. Thus, the strength of neo-Gramscian approach is mostly attributed to its distinguished focus on social aspects of hegemony.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the concept of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the context of globalisation by focusing on the articles of Bieler and Morton[1] and Worth[2]. After the theoretical overview of the concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony, the study aims to answer two questions. First, is current neoliberal global society, established through the Thatcher-Reagan doctrine, really global? Second, how does this relate to the so-called hegemony of neoliberalism and counter-hegemony of the progressive and nationalist responses to globalisation? The argument of this study is that the application of Gramscian notions to the international level results in a detachment from the national and historical context of Gramsci and that this disengagement causes neo-Gramscian approach to become less Gramscian for the sake of explaining international phenomena.

Theoretical Overview

The concept of hegemony, according to neo-Gramscian approach, is ‘an expression of broadly based consent manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions’[3]. In that respect, this approach has broadened the conventional understanding of hegemony, which focuses solely on economic and military capabilities. The dual perspectives of consent and force, according to neo-Gramscian perspective, are established by the leading social force in a given historical structure. Historical structure is ‘a picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints’[4]. According to Cox, these forces are material capabilities, ideas and institutions, which are in a reciprocal relationship with no predetermined hierarchy. The strength of each force changes from one historical structure to another, and thus is a historical question.[5]

The method of historical structures is applied to three spheres of activity, which are social relations of production, forms of state and world orders. According to neo-Gramscian approach, social relations of production are the terminus a quo for the analysis of hegemony as there is a relationship between power and production. Power in patterns of production leads to the empowerment of certain social forces and these social forces become the bases of power in forms of state, giving way to a particular world order. However, the understanding of power and production relations in neo-Gramscian approach is not only of materialistic nature; rather, it comprises the production and reproduction of knowledge, social relations, morals and institutions.[6] The second sphere of activity, which is forms of state, rests upon the social relations of production. Neo-Gramscian approach perceives state and structure as forming a solid structure, or in Gramsci’s words, a blocco storico (historic bloc)[7]. This solid structure, however, is not merely an alliance between state and social forces; it is rather an economic, political, intellectual and moral unity.[8] Accordingly, state does not only operate within a limited public sphere, but also works in the private sphere of civil society, such as religion, media and education. In that regard, state is a social relation rather than an institution distinct from civil society.[9] The last sphere of activity is world orders, which is the outward expansion of the hegemony of a certain historic bloc once it is consolidated in domestic sphere. This hegemony is generally supported by the mechanisms of international organisations.[10]

The concept of counter-hegemony, according to neo-Gramscian approach, refers to the resistance of social forces that challenge the overall ideology of the prevailing hegemonic order. If they become successful, these forces replace the hegemonic order with another, which is termed as ‘passive revolution’.  However, for the real transformation to occur, these new social forces should make several compromises with opposing groups after having built their hegemony. These compromises are thus necessary for the consolidation of the new hegemonic order.[11]

Is Neoliberal Global Society Really Global?

Robert Cox explains globalisation and the emergence of a global neoliberal society with the internationalisation of production and state. According to him, with the collapse of Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, a new global class structure started to emerge, in which ‘transnational managerial class’ gradually internationalised production and finance.[12] In accordance with this internationalisation, there emerged an ‘emulative uniformity’ between state officials, business and representatives of international organisations, restructuring the role of state.[13] Consequently, the state has also been internationalised and has become ‘a transmission belt for neo-liberalism’[14]

As also pointed out by Bieler and Morton, the internationalisation thesis has been criticized by many scholars, including Leo Panitch. Panitch criticizes the metaphor of transmission belt and claims that ‘globalisation is authored by states’, undermining the argument of Cox.[15] The response given by Bieler and Morton is that the thesis of internationalisation is not top-down as Panitch claims it to be on the grounds that ‘national context is the only place where an historic bloc can be founded’, showing the integral role of the state.[16] Moreover, they put forward that globalisation also involves a process of internalisation between several classes within states.

However, an important shortcoming of the internationalisation argument remains unanswered in their article. The problem is that Gramsci originally perceived state as being comprised of political society and civil society. Accordingly, the existence of a global society would directly necessitate the existence of a form of ‘international’ state. In the same vein with Panitch’s criticism, Germain and Kenny put forward that ‘the concept of global civil society here gains meaning precisely through its relationship to the national state or the world market rather than the ‘international’ or ‘internationalizing state’. Even more importantly, a truly Gramscian understanding of civil society would require the existence of a political society and an institutionalised structure, rather than a ‘fluid process of consensus formation’ with no global political society.[17]

Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in a Global Context

If there is not a global civil society in a truly Gramscian sense, the question is how can the hegemony of neoliberal society and counter-hegemony of responses to globalisation be explained? Even more importantly, how can one evaluate the strength of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces in a global context?

According to Cox, the global hegemony is exerted internationally by hegemonic forces within a powerful economic state. Accordingly, counter-hegemonic movements emerge from within different states in order to challenge this hegemony.[18] According to Worth, ‘world hegemony is less totalised and more fragmented . . . [and] the appearance of counter-hegemony can take differing forms’[19]. In accordance with this argument, Worth proposes two different ‘janus-like’ forces that can be considered as counter-hegemonic formations, namely progressive and nationalist forces. He points out that these movements may seem to be too weak and inconsistent to challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism at first glance. However, he asserts, these ideological alternatives have deep roots in history and that the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony creates a more favourable environment for these movements. While progressive forces can use transnational ties for their own project, nationalists can increase their power by pointing out to the weakening of national identity as a result of neoliberal hegemony.[20]

Even though this kind of modification of the original Gramscian understanding of hegemony and counter-hegemony has practical advantages, it is a rather simplistic and symptomatic reading of Gramsci. The first setback of such an approach is that the strength of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces in a global context is almost impossible to be traced down. In that regard, while there is almost no doubt that neoliberal ideology has a global dominance; it is hard to define this dominance as ‘hegemony’ in Gramscian terms predominantly due to the difficulty of measuring its strength on a global scale. The second setback is the ‘resilience of local culture’. Even though the dominance of neoliberal ideology can be observed all over the world, it is also observed that ‘local culture changes the emphasis of neo-liberalism wherever and whenever it comes into contact with it.’[21]

 

Conclusion

Neo-Gramscian approach, with its valuable insights on the relationship between social production relations and power, offers an alternative framework for the analysis of globalisation.  However, it is highly problematic to use the concepts that were originally created to fit the national and historical context of Gramsci. Accordingly, it has been argued in this paper that the application of Gramscian notions to the international level results in a detachment from the national and historical context of Gramsci and that this disengagement causes neo-Gramscian approach to become less Gramscian for the sake of explaining international phenomena.

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that neo-Gramscian approach is unable to explain globalisation. On the contrary, the critical stance of neo-Gramscian scholars enables one to grasp the origins and social bases of neoliberalism. Unlike the problem-solving theories, to use Cox’s terminology, neo-Gramscian understanding of globalisation reveals how the global dominance of neoliberalism came about and how this dominance can be challenged by different forms of ideological forces. In that regard, neo-Gramscian approach is exceptionally crucial for a better understanding of the prospects of change.

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[1] Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations”, Capital & Class, vol. 82, 2004.

[2] Owen Worth, “The Janus-like Character of Counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism”, Global Society, vol. 16, no. 3, 2002.

[3] Bieler and Morton, p. 87.

[4] Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, 1981, p. 135.

[5] Cox, 1981, p. 136.

[6] Bieler and Morton, pp. 89-90.

[7] Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, 1983, p. 167.

[8] Bieler and Morton, p. 90.

[9] Bieler and Morton, p. 92.

[10] Bieler and Morton, p. 93.

[11] Worth, p. 299.

[12] Bieler and Morton, p. 94.

[13] Bieler and Morton, p. 95.

[14] Bieler and Morton, p. 96.

[15] Bieler and Morton, p. 101.

[16] Bieler and Morton, p. 102.

[17] Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, Review of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, 1998, p. 17.

[18] Worth, p. 300.

[19] Worth, p. 301.

[20] Worth, p. 314.

[21] Germain and Kenny, pp. 18-19.

Liberalism in the aftermath of the Cold War: Is it really the end of history?

One of the most striking characteristics of world politics is uncertainty in international system. The end of the Cold War was one of the events which clearly indicated the improbability of international relations as the dissolution of the Soviet Union shocked everyone despite the apparent failures of communism for years. Liberalism, as one of the mainstream theories in International Relations, contemplated the end of the Cold War as the end of history and triumph of liberalism over other approaches in the discipline. However, the ability of Liberalism to predict the end of the Cold War remained open to discussion.

The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the validity of Liberalism as an International Relations theory at the end of the Cold War by focusing on two articles written from two different standpoints. The first article is ‘Liberalism and the End of the Cold War’ by Michael W. Doyle[1], which evaluates how Liberalism accounted for the end of the Cold War with a focus on change and democratic peace. The second article is ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’ by John Lewis Gaddis[2], which puts forward that behavioural, structural and evolutionary theoretical approaches in International Relations failed in predicting the end of the Cold War while the main purpose of theorizing was making such predictions. It is argued herein that while Liberalism remains one of the major theoretical approaches in International Relations, it was not as successful as usually claimed in (1) predicting the end of the Cold War, and, (2) explaining the post-Cold War era.

Liberalism: An Overview

Liberalism emerged as an International Relations theory after the First World War and was drawn upon the writings of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, David Hume, Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter. Liberalism has been based upon the importance of the freedom of the individual, which accordingly engendered a Liberal commitment to rights and institutions. According to Liberals, there are three basic freedoms: (1) negative freedom, i.e. freedom from arbitrary authority, (2) positive freedom, i.e. promotion of opportunity for freedom, and (3) democratic participation, i.e. the will of citizens, which guarantees the first two freedoms.[3]

There are three different strands of Liberalism. The first strand is based upon the writings of John Locke, who put forward that Politick Society (i.e. civil society) and demand for freedom would work as a response to arbitrary use of power.[4] The second strand of Liberalism is based upon the works of Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter and is usually called Economic Liberalism. Schumpeter emphasizes the relationship between democracy and capitalism, claiming that rational individuals in a capitalist state will demand democratic governance. Similarly, Fukuyama puts forward that the end of the Cold War meant the victory of consumer capitalism and democracy, which he calls as “the end of history”.[5] The last strand of Liberalism, Liberal Internationalism, is drawn upon the writings of Immanuel Kant and points out that there is a separate peace among liberal states even though they remain war-prone towards non-liberals, which can be called as imprudent vehemence or aggression. According to Doyle, it is observed from the history that this liberal zone of peace has been expanding through commerce and wars.[6]

Liberalism in the post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War constituted an opportunity to test the ability of International Relations theories to forecast changes in world politics. As Gaddis points out, even the theoretical approaches with distinguished focus on change failed to see this systemic transformation.[7] Liberalism was one of the theories based on the idea that ‘historical processes operate in a linear manner’.[8] This linear evolutionist standpoint is particularly evident in interdependence studies, which have a connection to Liberal school, and democratic peace theory.

Classical Liberalism and Interdependence Studies

According to Gaddis, Classical Liberals and interdependence studies primarily criticized Realists for reducing international relations to a shallow struggle for power and neglecting the importance of increasing commerce and communications which surpassed that of geopolitical competition. They tended to focus on the establishment of international regimes based on integration and cooperation during the Cold War.[9] This standpoint would explain the end of the Cold War with the cooperative relations between the United States and Soviet Russia during the last years of the Cold War. However, as Gaddis points out, this approach has some defects from its origin on the grounds that the cooperative regimes of the Cold War ‘grew out of a security dilemma’, not because of the possible economic profits as Classical Liberals would suggest.[10] In that regard, explaining the end of the Cold War with cooperative relations between the United States and the Soviet Union would also be reductionism, the same mistake Realists did.

Another linear evolutionist from the Liberal tradition is Francis Fukuyama, who claimed that the end of the Cold War constituted the victory of Western liberalism and that ‘the struggle over alternative ways of life, of identity, meaning, or purpose, will come to an end’ in the post-Cold War era.[11] However, his perspective is defected because of two main reasons. First, he overlooks the success of other alternatives. Communism, in practice, was indeed an effective mode of production considering the growth rates of Eastern European countries until 1980s. Furthermore, semi-planned economies and capitalist syndicalism of East Asia – Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan – may well constitute a viable alternative to free market capitalism.[12] In addition, the years following the end of the Cold War have shown that free market capitalism brings its own collapse, as Marx had claimed[13]. Second problem with his perspective is what Gaddis calls as the Fukuyama fallacy, i.e. ‘the tendency for those who advance propositions about irreversible forces in history to conclude that history will stop with them’[14]; from which all linear evolutionists suffer.

Liberal Internationalists and Democratic Peace Theory

The most important figure in Democratic Peace is Michael W. Doyle, who pointed out to the influence of democratization and the separate peace among liberal states, by drawing his approach upon the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant mentioned about a pacific union to be established through commerce and wars.[15] In the same manner, Doyle puts forward that liberal democracies tend to be peaceful in their relations with other democracies while they may be war-prone towards non-liberals. From an historical perspective, he explores international relations and comes to the conclusion that there is an ‘accelerating trend toward democratic forms of government over the past two centuries’[16]. In the light of this finding, he puts forward that the world history witnessed the emergence of a liberal zone of peace. His standpoint is similar to that of Kantian liberal internationalists as he focuses on commercial and transnational ties as well as the liberalizing effect of global civil society and universal values.[17]

However, as Doyle himself emphasizes, the spread of democracy does not directly lead peace. Firstly, as he points out, liberal democracies are not all the same, meaning that there are some minimal differences among them. For instance, Japanese and American democracies do not resemble each other on the grounds that ‘Japanism always seems more important than liberalism’ in the former.[18] Similarly, Germany was considered as not a fully liberal state, leading to suspicions, increasing tensions, and a world war. Secondly, the imprudent aggressiveness of liberal democracies (e.g. imperialism) indicates that democracy does not always guarantee peace.[19]

In the light of these, Doyle asserts that the collapse of the Soviet Union was stimulated by ‘pressures from below’ and ‘decisions at the top’.[20] The accelerating tendency toward democracy, in that regard, led to Gorbachev’s decision to reform the Soviet Union, starting a process that brought the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse. From this viewpoint, Gaddis argues, ‘Soviet-American reconciliation should have been an entirely predictable development’[21] However, the predictive capability of Democratic Peace appears to be no better than other perspectives in the sense that such long-term historical processes, which Doyle explored, ‘can only be discovered from consequences they produce’[22] In that respect, while Liberalism claimed to have predictive ability due to having a focus on change, it failed to forecast the end of the Cold War.

Another criticism to Doyle’s standpoint is that, as Gaddis points out, while authoritarianism is not a permanent condition, democratization is also ‘not an irreversible process’[23]. It is observed in the history that democratic states may turn into authoritarian ones, such as the transformation of Italy into a fascist state and of Germany a Nazi state. In that respect, while the expansion of democracies and the democratization of the Soviet Union are rightful observations, it is not guaranteed that liberal democracies and accordingly the zone of peace will remain the same for the following decades. Furthermore, Democratic Peace fails to explain the post-Cold War examples of convergence of interests between democratic and authoritarian states. Even though Doyle maintains that liberal democracies will be war-prone towards non-liberals, the United States has long cooperated with authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia. In that respect, it is observed that notwithstanding the accelerating trend towards democracy, the reason of state and geopolitical considerations continue to be significant in bilateral relations of states in the post-Cold War era.

In conclusion, while Liberalism remains as an important approach in International Relations, it was not successful in predicting the end of the Cold War and in explaining some aspects of the post-Cold War era. Firstly, uncertainty in international relations made it hard for Liberals to forecast the coming of an era that lasted for more than forty years despite their notable focus on change. Their inability primarily stemmed from the fact that such processes are inherently unpredictable, and can only be observed from their consequences. Secondly, they also could not explain some aspects of world politics in the aftermath of the Cold War primarily due to their linear evolutionism. It is true that the Soviet Union was democratized and liberalized, leading to the collapse of this so-called authoritarian regime. However, the emergence of new challenges to democracy, such as religious fundamentalism, was not explained by the Liberals. Furthermore, while some parts of the world have become more liberalized and democratized, in other parts, there is an observable protectionism and authoritarianism. In that respect, while it is still a significant theory in International Relations, Liberalism remains weak in predicting as well as explaining some aspects of world politics.

 

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[1] Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and the End of the Cold War”, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, eds. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, Colombia University Press, New York, 1996.

[2] John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War”, International Security, vol. 17, no. 3, 1992-93, pp. 5-58.

[3] Doyle, pp. 2-3.

[4] Doyle, pp. 3-4.

[5] Doyle, pp. 4-5.

[6] Doyle, pp. 8-9.

[7] Gaddis, p. 6.

[8] Gaddis, p. 39.

[9] Gaddis, p. 41.

[10] Gaddis, p. 42.

[11] Doyle, p. 4.

[12] Doyle, p. 6.

[13] Gaddis, p. 47.

[14] Gaddis, p. 45.

[15] Doyle, pp. 8-9.

[16] Gaddis, p. 44.

[17] Doyle, p. 9.

[18] Doyle, p. 11.

[19] Doyle, p. 12.

[20] Doyle, p. 11.

[21] Gaddis, p. 44.

[22] Gaddis, p. 44.

[23] Gaddis, p. 47.

AKP’s Reconciliation of Islam and Democracy: Conjunctural or Structural?

Since the victory of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in November 2002 elections, whether AKP can genuinely commit itself to democracy has been a controversial issue. Considering the Islamic roots of the party, the results of this election created doubts about the true nature of AKP at both home and abroad. However, defining AKP as a pure Islamic party has many shortcomings, especially considering the fact that the party is most likely not committed to the religious transformation of state. Nevertheless, it is even more erroneous to claim that the leaders of AKP have truly changed their religious stance after 2002 and that the AKP is a conservative democrat party, reconciling Islam and democracy. In that respect, it is argued in this paper that AKP was predominantly urged by pragmatist reasons in changing its discourse and actions to create an appearance that democracy and Islam are reconciled in Turkey.

In its simplest meaning, an Islamic party is one whose main intention is a regime change in accordance with the Islamic worldview, and correspondingly, Islamization of state and society. As pointed out by Hasan Turunc[1], there were two main ideological groups within the Welfare Party: traditional standpoint, represented by Erbakan, and modernist standpoint, represented by Erdoğan. In contrast to the traditionalists whose support base was Islamic institutions, the modernist camp endeavored the incorporation of periphery, including women youth and unemployed people, into their political base. This split within the Islamist group gave rise to the establishment of AKP, gaining an outstanding victory in 2002 elections.

During the first AKP administration, the party tended to demonstrate itself as a conservative democrat party, resembling those in Western Europe. One of the first declarations of the party was its commitment to democracy and secular character of the Turkish state. Regarding foreign policy, the party followed a pro-Western path by committing itself to EU integration process and establishing close relations with the United States. However, it is argued by many scholars that the commitment to the EU during the first AKP period was due to pragmatic reasons, for AKP perceived the reforms as an opportunity to enhance religious freedom in Turkey. After the decision of the European Court of Justice on headscarf, for example, the discourse on the EU changed considerably.

It should be noted that while AKP was named as a fundamentalist party before 2002 elections in international media, this image changed considerably throughout ten years of AKP administration. The role of the United States in this process in crucial in that AKP has since been presented as a model to the Islamic world with its so-called reconciliation of Islam and democracy. This is evident in the speeches of American politicians, in the writings of American scholars as well as in the mainstream U.S. media. However, presenting Turkey as such conceals the actions that undermine democracy in Turkey. The most prominent example is the deterioration of checks and balances and the resultant rise in the power of executive. The claim that AKP is committed to democracy is also undermined by the large number of journalists under arrest. Since 2002, there is also a change in the discourse of Erdogan, who once championed democracy and secularism. The recent example that resulted in a major controversy in Turkey is his speech that they will raise religious generations.

In conclusion, AKP’s claim of having reconciled Islam and democracy appears to be baseless due to the fact that the discourses and actions of AKP during the first administration started to disappear in the second and third period. Whether AKP has a secret agenda to establish an Islamic state in Turkey, as ultra-nationalist seculars in Turkey claim, remains uncertain. However, it is observed both in domestic politics and foreign policy that the focus on Muslim identity started to override the emphasis on democracy. Claiming that the reconciliation of Islam and democracy was conjunctural; however, does not necessarily mean the leaders of AKP remained as they were in 1990s. The party was moderated due to its electoral concerns as well as international pressure. Yet, the Islamist roots have not completely disappeared, showing that such reconciliation was not of structural nature.

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[1] Hasan Turunc, “Islamicist or Democratic? The AKP’s Search for Identity in Turkish Politics”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2007, p. 81.

Center-Periphery Approach in Turkish Politics: An overview

            An overview of the literature on political structure in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey reveals that the center-periphery approach is widely used in analyzing the relations between Turkish state and society (Güngen and Erten, 2005: 1). This approach was initially introduced by Şerif Mardin and according to him, in the Ottoman context; center-periphery cleavage refers to the clash between ‘a lasting center supported by a sophisticated network of institutions’ and peripheral forces with de facto autonomy (Mardin, 1973: 169-170). This approach, with its focus on the continuity of such relation, enables one to track down the current societal and political divisions in Turkey; however, it also has a number of methodological shortcomings and is criticized due to its neglect of some important realities.

            Haldun Gülalp (2001: 434) points out that the scholars who analyzed Turkish politics and society mostly emphasized “status”-related, ideological and cultural dynamics in Turkey and by showing the political Islam – becoming the peripheral force in modern Turkey –  as counter-elites, these scholars emerge as the critics of modernization theory. Though criticized by some, the fact that this approach enables one to observe ideological and cultural divergences between the center and periphery rather than purely political ones is an important strength of the approach. As put forward by Arnold Leder (1979: 83), the cultural differences between two forces were perceived as the most important societal cleavage by those in the periphery. The cultural differences were observable in the Ottoman era in that the center was using the Persian and Arabic languages and represented the urban culture while the periphery was representing the nomad culture with ‘its own extremely varied counter-culture’ (Mardin, 1973: 173). In that respect, this approach enables one to track down the cultural factors underlying the societal and political divisions. It was predominantly due to such divergences that during this era, the center was highly suspicious about the provinces due to the perception that they were the ‘hotbeds of intractable religious heterodoxy . . . [serving] as a launching pad for rebellions’ (Mardin, 1973: 171). It was, according to this approach, similar in the modern Turkey. Levent Köker (1995: 58) draws attention to the fact that ‘Government for the people, in spite of the people’ was a famous maxim in Turkish politics, indicating the lack of trust of the central forces – military-bureaucratic elite – in democratic self-government – represented by the peripheral forces.

            Apart from its strength in emphasizing the status-related cultural factors underlying the political cleavage, this approach also enables the observation of continuities in such center-periphery relations. According to Mardin (1973: 179-181), even though the modernization period in the Ottoman Empire replaced ‘patrimonial’ and ‘sultanic’ bureaucracy with a ‘rational bureaucracy, the center-periphery cleavage remained on the grounds that this new school-trained bureaucrats – Union and Progress – opposed to the decentralization demands of the provincial notables. Similarly, in the single-party period of modern Turkey, Kemalist elite favored ‘an authoritarian-centralized political framework’ despite the discourses on republicanism and democracy (Köker, 1995: 58). Even the so-called democratic 1961 Constitution, according to this approach, ‘re-institutionalized state’ and the main motive of providing basic rights and liberties was ‘protecting the state elite against ‘the tyranny of the majority’’ (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 265).

            This standpoint, however, is criticized for a number of aspects, which reveals the weaknesses of the center-periphery dichotomy approach. Güngen and Erten (2005: 1) point out that this approach defines the characteristics of Turkish society in relation with the Western social transformations and that this relativist approach is, in that sense, orientalist. Before analyzing the center-periphery cleavage in the Ottoman Empire, Mardin (1973: 170) lays down the differences between Western and Ottoman state, claiming that the Ottoman state differed from the European Leviathan in its inability to integrate peripheral forces into the polity and to give institutional autonomy to these forces. This point of view, according to Güngen and Erten (2005: 8), ‘conceptualizes Western history as continuous progress in terms of the development of civil society’ and thus turns it into an analytical and political ideal-type. They are also critical of the representation of Turkish politics as a continuity of center-periphery dichotomy, claiming that this approach is a liberal project to reduce more complex political and societal transformation to a rather simple understanding of linear progress. In that respect, the particularism of this approach neglects the necessity to ask ‘why it has and what is about social relations that bring about a political authority apparently autonomous from society’ (Güngen and Erten, 2005: 8-9).

            The shortcomings of the representation of Turkish societal and political structure as a mere dichotomy between the center, i.e. state elites, and periphery, i.e. society, are also observed in the Gramscian approach of Ahmet Öncü (2003). In his article, Öncü criticizes the long-enduring state autonomy tradition in the literature on Turkish politics and society, and points out that ‘[t]he economically powerful classes have continually sought to establish their hegemony more in state perhaps than in civil society’ (2003: 322). Even more importantly, he puts forward that most scholars with such tradition assumed the center, or state elites, as a coherent group with a collective identity who were in opposition to dominant peripheral forces in society – landlords and local notables. However, he claims, state elites were mostly unable to form a collective unity and rather than constituting one edge of a binary opposition (2003: 323), they mostly represented the interests of such dominant peripheral forces. In that sense, unlike what center-periphery approach claims, the foundation of the republic was possible owing to the ‘accommodation between the commercial bourgeoisie, the landed class, and the civilian and military bureaucracy’ (Öncü, 2003: 315). He also points out that during the single-party period; the coercive measures used vis-à-vis political opposition from Islamist after 1927 was accompanied by a support from dominant forces in the periphery. When bourgeoisie, landowners and local notables increased their economic power, they resulted in a change in the hegemonic bloc and emergence of Democratic Party (Öncü, 2003: 316-317). There also emerged a clash between the interests of industrial bourgeoisie, and, landowners and local notables in the sense that the electoral support base of DP was countryside and this increased the power of landowners and local notables vis-à-vis industrial bourgeoisie, resulting in the latter to leave the hegemonic bloc in the state (Öncü, 2003: 317). In that respect, the center-periphery approach of Mardin is also unable to reflect the internal contradictions within both the center and periphery.

            In a nutshell, the center-periphery approach enables one to observe the continuity of cultural differences underlying the political dichotomy in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. However, its relativism, particularism as well as the neglect of internal contradictions within center and periphery and of the overwhelming impact of hegemonic bloc interests on the state remain as important setbacks of this approach.

Bibliography

Ahmet Öncü, “Dictatorship Plus Hegemony: A Gramscian Analysis of the Turkish State, Science & Society, vol. 67, no. 3, 2003, pp. 303-328.

Ali Rıza Güngen and Şafak Erten, “Approaches of Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper on State and Civil Society in Turkey”, Journal of Historical Studies, no.3, 2005, pp. 1-14.

Arnold Leder, “Party Competition in Rural Turkey: Agent of Change or Defender of Traditional Rule?”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 1979, pp. 82-105.

Haldun Gülalp, “Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, 2001, pp. 433-448.

Levent Köker, “Local Politics and Democracy in Turkey: An Appraisal”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 540, 1995, pp. 51-62.

Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 34, no. 4, 1998, pp. 259-277.

Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus, vol. 102, no. 1, 1973, pp. 169-190.